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increased number of cases. Among the seven Court of Appeals decisions examined are Thornton v. Roosevelt Hospital and George v.
Mount Sinai Hospital, both of which substantially effect the law
governing limitations of time. In Thornton, the Court applied the
date-of-introduction accrual rule for foreign substances in a products liability case. The Thornton Court used the rule applicable to
tort actions generally to the still-evolving theory of strict products
liability. Significantly, the Court declined to adopt a discovery rule
of accrual even though the resulting injury may not manifest itself
until well after the statute of limitations has elapsed. In George, the
Court ruled that a personal injury action commenced in the name
of a deceased plaintiff was not a "nullity," for purposes of CPLR
205. The plaintiff, therefore, was entitled to a 6-month extension of
the statute of limitations within which to recommence the action in
the name of the proper party plaintiff.
Cohen v. Pearl River School District,one of several important
lower court decisions commented upon in The Survey, is concerned
with the effect of the 1976 amendments to section 50-e of the General Municipal Law. In Cohen, the Appellate Division, Second Department, ruled that infancy does not toll the period for which a
court may grant leave to file a late notice of claim.
It is hoped that this issue of The Survey will continue to further
its traditional goal of keeping the New York practitioner informed
of significant developments in state practice through thoughtful
analysis of recent decisions.
ARTICLE

2

-

LIMITATIONS OF TIME

CPLR 203(a): Cause of action in strict products liability for druginduced injuries accrues upon injection of drug
CPLR 203(a) provides that the statute of limitations begins to
run when the cause of action accrues.' Tort actions generally accrue
on the date of the plaintiffs injury.2 Where the time of exposure to
Also valuable are the two joint reports of the Senate Finance and Assembly Ways and Means
Committee:
FIFTH REP.
.028
1961 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 15 ............................
SIXTH REP.
029
1962 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 8 ..............................
CPLR 203(a) provides that "[tihe time within which an action must be commenced
. . . shall be computed from the time the cause of action accrued to the time the claim is
interposed." A cause of action accrues when "the plaintiff first [becomes] enabled to maintain the particular action in question." Cary v. Koerner, 200 N.Y. 253, 259, 93 N.E. 979, 982
201.02, 203.01; Developments in the Law - Statutes of
(1910); accord, 1 WK&M
Limitations, 63 HAnv. L. REv. 1177, 1200 (1950).
2 E.g., Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 299-300, 200 N.E. 824,
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a deleterious substance and the manifestation of the resulting injury
are not contemporaneous, however, the possibility arises that a
claim may be time-barred before the plaintiff becomes aware of its
existence. 3 Nonetheless, the established rule in New York is that a
cause of action for damages caused by substances introduced into
the plaintiff's body accrues upon the invasion, regardless of when
the injury manifests itself.4 Recently, in Thornton v. Roosevelt
Hospital,5 the Court of Appeals examined the timeliness of a wrongful death action brought approximately 20 years after an allegedly
carcinogenic chemical was injected into the decedent and held that
the cause of action, pleaded in strict products liability, accrued on
the date of the injection.'
While a patient at Roosevelt Hospital in 1954, Mrs. Thornton
was injected with Thorotrast, a radioactive salt used to facilitate xray examinations. 7 Nearly 20 years later, she developed a carcinoma
which proved fatal.' Within 3 years of the onset of the cancer, her
husband brought an action for wrongful death sounding in negligence and breach of warranty against the manufacturer of Thorotrast and the hospital.' Special Term dismissed both causes of action as untimely, but granted the plaintiff leave to replead in strict
products liability.'0 On appeal, the Appellate Division, First Department, modified the lower court's order by striking the portion
granting leave to amend the complaint and, as modified, affirmed
the order."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the appellate divi827 (1936); 1 WK&M 214.16.
See Estep & Van Dyke, Radiation Injuries: Statute of Limitations Inadequacies in
Tort Cases, 62 MICH. L. REv. 753, 759-69 (1964); Developments in the Law - Statutes of
Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1177, 1200-07 (1950).
Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 188 N.E.2d 142, 237
N.Y.S.2d 714, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 808 (1963).
47 N.Y.2d 780, 391 N.E.2d 1002, 417 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979), aff'g 59 App. Div. 2d 680,
398 N.Y.S.2d 659 (1st Dep't 1977).
6 47 N.Y.2d at 781, 391 N.E.2d at 1003, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 921-22.
Id. at 782, 391 N.E.2d at 1003, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 922 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting). Thorotrast is the manufacturer's trade name for thorium dioxide. Id.
Id. (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
Id., 391 N.E.2d at 1004, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 922 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting). The plaintiff
alleged that both the hospital and the manufacturer knew that Thorotrast was potentially
carcinogenic, but never disclosed that fact to the decedent. Id. Claiming that the decedent's
death was caused by the Thorotrast injection, the plaintiff further asserted that the carcinoma did not come into existence until sometime after 1972, and submitted as evidence the
lack of symptoms and the negative results of examinations of the decedent conducted between 1950 and 1972. Id.
,o Id., 391 N.E.2d at 1003, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 922 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
59 App.Div. 2d 680, 398 N.Y.S.2d 659 (1st Dep't 1977).
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sion.12 In a memorandum opinion,13 the Court initially noted that
the cause of action for strict products liability accrues on the date
of the injury, as does any cause of action sounding in tort. 4 The
majority observed that it is well-settled in New York that injuries
caused by the injection of chemical compounds into the body occur
at the time of injection. 5 Since there was a 20-year interval between
the time of the invasion of the chemical and the interposition of the
claim, the action was found to be time-barred. 6 The Court then
"247 N.Y.2d at 781, 391 N.E.2d at 1003, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 921.
,"Chief Judge Cooke and Judges Jasen, Gabrielli, Jones and Wachtler concurred in the
majority while Judge Fuchsberg dissented.
14 47 N.Y.2d at 781, 391 N.E.2d at 1003, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 921. The majority noted that
in Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 335 N.E.2d 275, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39
(1975), see note 35 infra, a cause of action in strict products liability was held to accrue on
the date of injury. 47 N.Y.2d at 781, 391 N.E.2d at 1003, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 921-22. The
Thornton Court emphasized that Victorson did not alter, expressly or implicitly, the general
rule of accrual in tort cases. Id.
,547 N.Y.2d at 781, 391 N.E.2d at 1003, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 922 (citing Schwartz v. Heyden
Newport Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 188 N.E.2d 142, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714, cert. denied, 374
U.S. 808 (1963)). Schwartz was the product of the Court's earlier decision in Schmidt v.
Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824 (1936), a case that was not
mentioned by the Thornton majority. Schmidt involved a plaintiff who developed a lung
disease after inhaling dust while employed by the defendant. Several years after his employment had terminated, the plaintiff brought an action in negligence against his former employer. Id. at 297, 200 N.E. at 825. Acknowledging that damage was the essence of a negligence claim, the Schmidt Court emphasized that "[i]t
is only the injury to person or property arising from negligence which constitutes an invasion of a personal right, protected by
law, and, therefore, an actionable wrong." Id. at 300, 200 N.E. at 827 (emphasis in original).
According to the Schmidt Court, the injury occurred when the wrongful invasion took place.
Id. Therefore, the Court concluded that the plaintiff's injury occurred when he had inhaled
the dust. Id. at 301, 200 N.E. at 827. This result seems inconsistent with the Court's earlier
statement that a cause of action can accrue only when the alleged negligence "produce[s]
injury," id. at 300, 200 N.E. at 827, since any other rule might result in a cause of action
being "barred before liability arose," id. See also note 24 and accompanying text infra.
In Schwartz, the plaintiff developed cancer from a substance manufactured by the defendant that had been injected into his body some 13 years earlier. 12 N.Y.2d at 215, 188 N.E.2d
at 143, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 715. The majority, following Schmidt, ruled that the injury occurred,
and the cause of action accrued, at the time of the injection. Id. at 217, 188 N.E.2d at 144,
237 N.Y.S.2d at 717. Noting that one of the damages recoverable in a negligence action is
harm to the "structure of the body," the Court questioned whether a cause of action can exist
before such damage occurs. Nevertheless, relying on Schmidt, the Court found that the injury
to the body takes place at the time of the initial exposure to the deleterious substance. Id. In
a dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Desmond noted that, if the carcinogenic properties of the
injection were not readily discoverable until some future time, "it would be unreasonable and
perhaps unconstitutional" to bar his suit before he possibly could learn of the wrong. Id. at
219, 188 N.E.2d at 146, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 719. (Desmond, C.J., dissenting). The majority's
adherence to Schmidt has been criticized in that its concern for repose overlooks the injustice
of barring a claim before its existence has become known. See 27 ALB. L. REv. 315 (1963).
,147 N.Y.2d at 781, 391 N.E.2d at 1003, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 922.
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considered whether it should extend the "discovery" rule 17 to embrace initially undetectable injuries caused by latent defects in ingested substances."8 Although the legislature sanctioned the application of the discovery rule in medical malpractice cases "based
upon the discovery of a foreign object in the body of the patient,"' 9
the Court observed that CPLR 214-a expressly excludes chemical
compounds from classification as foreign objects.2" Accordingly, the
majority refused to extend the discovery rule to strict products liability actions involving chemical compounds."
Dissenting vigorously,2 2 Judge Fuchsberg asserted that in view
of the prevalence of drugs with a potential for long-term injurious
effects, an injured plaintiff should "not be foreclosed from having
his day in court before he even has knowledge of any injury and
certainly not before any injury has occurred." 3 In light of the many
17Id. In certain limited circumstances, the statute of limitations does not begin to run
until the time of discovery. See generally SIEGEL § 43 (1978). For example, the statute of
limitations in a fraud case is either 6 years from the commission of the fraud, or 2 years from
the date the plaintiff discovered or reasonably could have discovered the fraud, whichever is
longer. CPLR 203(f) (Supp. 1979-1980); SIEGEL § 43 (1978).
" 47 N.Y.2d at 781, 391 N.E.2d at 1003, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 922.
" CPLR 214-a. The statutory provision was enacted after the Court of Appeals had
adopted the foreign object discovery rule in Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d
427, 248 N.E.2d 871, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1969). Flanaganinvolved a plaintiff who underwent
surgery in 1958. After attacks of pain in 1966, it was discovered that surgical clamps had been
left in her abdomen. Id. at 428, 248 N.E.2d at 871, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 24. In the plaintiff's suit
for negligence, commenced in 1966, the defendant contended that the action was time-barred
because the negligent act had occurred 8 years earlier. The Court dismissed this argument,
holding that where a foreign object has been left within the body, the statute of limitations
does not run until the date the plaintiff reasonably could have discovered the malpractice.
Id. at 431, 248 N.E.2d at 873, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 27.
2047 N.Y.2d at 781, 391 N.E.2d at 1003, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 922. CPLR 214-a provides in
pertinent part:
[Wihere the action is based upon the discovery of a foreign object in the body of
the patient, the action may be commenced within one year of the date of such
discovery or of the date of discovery of facts which would reasonably lead to such
discovery, whichever is earlier . . . . For the purpose of this section the term
"foreign object" shall not include a chemical compound, fixation device or prosthetic aid or device.
CPLR 214-a (Supp. 1979-1980).
21 47 N.Y.2d at 781, 391 N.E.2d at 1003, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 922. The Court maintained that
the matter was more appropriate for legislative redress. Id.
2 Id. at 782-85, 391 N.E.2d at 1003-06, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 922-24.
2 Id. at 783-84, 391 N.E.2d at 1004, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 923. (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
Judge Fuchsberg indicated that the cause of action could have accrued at three points: 1) on
the date the compound was injected, 2) the date the debilitating process actually began on
the decedent's body, regardless of her awareness of it, or 3) the date when the disease first
became sufficiently evident to indicate to the deceased that an injury had occurred. Id. Either
of the latter two dates, he asserted, would mandate a trial inasmuch as the action would not
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advances made in modem products liability law, 24 Judge Fuchsberg
opined that the common-law rule of accrual on the date of ingestion25 was outmoded and should be overruled. 26 Additionally, he
posited that the policy considerations that led to granting infants
additional time in which to commence actions may be less compelling than those that exist in the case of a drug-injured plaintiff.2
Finally, Judge Fuchsberg characterized the majority's deferral to
"abdithe legislature to correct an unjust rule of common law as an
'
cation of [the Court's] role in the scheme of government."
While it cannot be gainsaid that Thornton is consistent with
prior law,29 it is suggested that the rigid accrual rule applied by the
majority should be reexamined in light of the underlying purposes
of the statute of limitations and the recent developments in
products liability law. The justification for protecting defendants
against stale claims rests in part upon the assumption that the
diligent plaintiff is aware or reasonably can ascertain that he has a
cause of action." When reasons other than lack of diligence render
timely suit impracticable, however, concern for the defendant must
be weighed against the possibility of denying the plaintiff a remedy. 31 These considerations contributed greatly to the development
be necessarily time-barred. Id. Additionally, the dissent noted that several courts had
adopted a discovery rule in situations involving substances with deleterious characteristics.
Id.

24 Id.

at 784, 391 N.E.2d at 1005, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 924 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
See Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 188 N.E.2d 142, 237
N.Y.S.2d 714, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 808 (1963); Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co.,
270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824 (1936); note 4 and accompanying text supra.
25 47 N.Y.2d at 785, 391 N.E.2d at 1005, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 924 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
v Id. at 785, 391 N.E.2d at 1005, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 924 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting); see
CPLR 208 (Supp. 1979-1980). Under CPLR 208, any statute of limitations of less than 3 years
is tolled during the plaintiff's infancy. Where the statute of limitations is 3 years or more,
CPLR 208 gives the plaintiff 3 years after he reaches majority to commence his action,
provided the applicable limitation period does not expire more than 3 years after the infancy
disability ends. In medical malpractice cases, CPLR 208 may not operate to extend the
limitation period beyond 10 years of the accrual of the cause of action. Id.
47 N.Y.2d at 785, 391 N.E.2d at 1006, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 924 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
5 See Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 188 N.E.2d 142, 237
N.Y.S.2d 714, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 808 (1963); Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co.,
270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824 (1936); note 4 and accompanying text supra.
1 See generally Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 170 (1949); Flanagan v. Mount Eden
Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 430-32, 248 N.E.2d 871, 872-74, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23, 26-27 (1969). If
the injury should have been apparent to a party exercising ordinary care, the plaintiff's
ignorance of his cause of action should not prevent the statutory time period from starting to
run. See Developments in the Law - Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. Rzv. 1177, 120304 (1950).
3,See Estep & Van Dyke, Radiation Injuries: Statute of Limitations Inadequacies in
Tort Cases, 62 MIcH. L. REv. 753, 766 (1964); Phillips, An Analysis of Proposed Reform of
2
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of the law of products liability. 2 Prior to the recognition of a tort
action in strict products liability, the New York courts held that the
statute of limitations on claims for damages caused by defective
products began to run on the date of the sale. 3 After adopting the
strict products liability in tort theory,3' however, the Court of Appeals declared that the limitation period would not commence until
the date of injury.35 Notwithstanding that the date-of-injury rule
ProductsLiability Statutes of Limitations, 56 N.C.L. REv. 663, 675 (1978); Developments in
the Law - Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1177, 1203-05 (1950). The Supreme
Court has indicated that allowing the period of limitations to expire as a consequence of a
plaintiff's "blameless ignorance" would be inconsistent "with the traditional purposes of
statutes of limitations, which conventionally require the assertion of claims within a specified
period of time after notice of the invasion of legal rights." Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163,
170 (1949) (emphasis added); accord, Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427,
429-32, 248 N.E.2d 871, 872-74, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23, 25-28 (1969). See generally note 19 supra.
12See generally Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 335 N.E.2d 275,
373 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1975).
1 The rule was enunciated by the Court of Appeals in Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 344, 253 N.E.2d 207, 209, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490, 493 (1969). The defendant
in Mendel installed eight glass doors in 1958, one of which allegedly struck and injured the
plaintiff in 1965. Id. at 341-42, 253 N.E.2d at 208,*305 N.Y.S.2d at 491. The plaintiff sought
to recover for her injuries, alleging causes of action in negligence and breach of implied
warranty of fitness for a particular use. Id. at 342, 253 N.E.2d at 208, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 491. A
closely-divided Court of Appeals held that the statute of limitations in an action "for personal
injuries arising from a breach of warranty . . . is six years from the time the sale was
consummated." Id. at 344, 253 N.E.2d at 209, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 493 (citing CPLR 213(2)). The
pre-Code 6-year statute of limitations was found to be applicable in Mendel because the glass
doors were sold prior to the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code. 25 N.Y.2d at 345,
253 N.E.2d at 209, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 493; see N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-725 (McKinney 1964). Opining
that defects in a product often are the natural results of age and use, see 25 N.Y.2d at 346,
253 N.E.2d at 210, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 495, the Court stated that it was
willing to sacrifice the small percentage of meritorious claims that might arise after
the statutory period has run in order to prevent the many unfounded suits that
would be brought against manufacturers ad infinitum.
Id. Dissenting, Judge Breitel noted that as a result of the majority's decision, the injured
party's claim was time-barred "before [she] ever had one." See id., 253 N.E.2d at 211, 305
N.Y.S.2d at 495 (Breitel, J., dissenting). Judge Breitel maintained that, since a cause of
action in strict products liability sounded in tort, not contract, the contract limitation period
was inapplicable. Id. at 350-53, 253 N.E.2d at 213-15, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 499-501 (Breitel, J.,
dissenting). Criticized by the commentators, see Symposium - Mendel v. PittsburghPlate
Glass Company, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 62 (1970), the Mendel decision later expressly was
overruled by the Court in Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 400, 335
N.E.2d 275, 276, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39, 40 (1975); see note 35 infra.
Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 342, 298 N.E.2d 622, 628-29, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 46970 (1973).
11 Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 399, 335 N.E.2d 275, 276, 373
N.Y.S.2d 39, 40 (1975). Victorson involved three cases in which claims were asserted against
the manufacturers of allegedly defective products by users who were not in privity with the
defendants. 37 N.Y.2d at 400, 335 N.E.2d at 276-77, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 41. The Court noted
that, although injuries sustained from an allegedly defective product could yield only a single
claim, the claim could be grounded in one of several theories of liability. Id. Expressly
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achieves neither repose nor protection against stale claims where a
defective product causes injury many years after it has been put into
the stream of commerce, the doctrine has been justified by considerations of fairness to the plaintiff."
It is submitted that the Thornton Court's ruling that the plaintiffs claim was time-barred before the carcinoma became apparent
conflicts with the rationale behind the current state of products
liability law.37 The date-of-injury accrual doctrine was adopted for
strict products liability cases in order to prevent a plaintiff from
being denied a cause of action before he suffers any injury.38 Similarly, it is suggested that where the invasion of the plaintiff's rights
is of an inherently unknowable nature, such as in the case of an
injection of a latently defective drug, the statute of limitations
should not start to run until the injured party reasonably can ascertain that he has a cause of action.3 9 Until such a rule is recognized,
overruling Mendel, see note 33 supra,the Victorson Court held that, since actions brought in
strict products liability were grounded in tort, 37 N.Y.2d at 402, 335 N.E.2d at 278, 373
N.Y.S.2d at 43, they were governed by the 3-year tort statute of limitations, which starts to
run on the date of the injury. Id. at 399-400, 335 N.E.2d at 276, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 40. The Court
noted that it "would defy both logic and experience" to hold that a cause of action in strict
products liability accrued before an injury is sustained. Id. at 403, 335 N.E.2d at 278, 373
N.Y.S.2d at 43. The Victorson decision has been hailed for its elimination of the confusion
surrounding the appropriate statutory limitation period that followed Mendel. See Note,
Statute of Limitation On Strict ProductsLiability Actions in New York, 40 ALB. L. REV. 869
(1976). See generally The Survey, 50 ST. JOHN'S L. Rav. 179, 181 (1975).
U Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 403, 335 N.E.2d 275, 279, 373
N.Y.S.2d 39, 44 (quoting Caffaro v. Trayna, 35 N.Y.2d 245, 250, 319 N.E.2d 174, 176, 360
N.Y.S.2d 847, 850-51 (1974)). See generally Note, Statute of Limitation On Strict Products
Liability Actions in New York, 40 ALB. L. REV. 869, 883 (1976).
7 It is suggested that the Thornton holding employs a rationale paralleling that employed in the now-defunct Mendel decision and runs contrary to the spirit of Victorson. See
Birnbaum & Rheingold, Torts, 28 SYRACUSE L. Rv. 525, 544 (1977). See generally notes 33 &
35 supra.
The rule of accrual at the time of initial exposure has been criticized as barring just
claims that are capable of being proved simply because the injury evidenced itself too late.
See Phillips, An Analysis of Proposed Reform of ProductsLiability Statutes of Limitations,
56 N.C.L. REv. 663, 675 (1978). In addition, it has been questioned whether any injury has
occurred at the time of the initial exposure. See Birnbaum & Rheingold, Torts, 28 SYRACUSE
L. REv. 525, 544 (1977). It has also been suggested that the rule could serve to "encourage
commercial irresponsibility on the part of manufacturers." Birnbaum, "FirstBreath's" Last
Gasp: The Discovery Rule in Products Liability Cases, 13 FORUM 279, 285 (1977).
1 See Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 403, 335 N.E.2d 275, 278,
373 N.Y.S.2d 39, 43 (1975); note 35 and accompanying text supra.
"' See Developments in the Law - Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARv. L. REV. 1177, 1207
(1950). Using this approach, the date of the manifestation of the injury would be the time of
accrual, rather than the date the defendant's wrongful conduct occurred. Id. The theory has
been employed by courts of other jurisdictions. For example, in Karjala v. Johns-Manville
Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1975), the court held that a cause of action for asbestos
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however, it appears that a sizeable group of products liability plaintiffs will be left without redress."
Peter McNamara
CPLR 205(a): 6-month extension available where priorpersonalinjury action improperly brought in name of deceased plaintiff was
voluntarily discontinued without prejudice to plaintiff's right to
commence an action under CPLR 205(a)
When a timely commenced action terminates after the expiration of the statute of limitations, CPLR 205(a) provides a 6-month
extension from the time of termination to commence a new action.4 '
poisoning does not accrue until the disease manifests itself. Id. at 160-61. Similarly, in Brush
Beryllium Co. v. Meckley, 284 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1960), a case involving exposure to pollutants, the cause of action was held to accrue at the time the plaintiff became aware of his
injury. One court has held that, for the statute of limitations to begin to run, the plaintiff
must have knowledge of the relationship between the offense and the damages sustained. See
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Hudson, 314 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1963). The second circuit has
held that the plaintiff's awareness of the presence of his injury is a prerequisite to the
commencement of the statutory period. See Ricciuti v. Voltarc Tubes, Inc., 277 F.2d 809 (2d
Cir. 1960).
At least one state appears to have avoided the time of accrual controversy by statutory
enactment. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 516.100 (Vernon 1952).
A lower New York court recently attempted to avoid the harshness of the injury-atinitial-exposure doctrine. In McKee v. Johns-Manville Corp., 94 Misc. 2d 327, 404 N.Y.S.2d
814 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1978), a case involving injury from exposure to asbestos, the court
held that the cause of action in strict products liability began to run on the date the injury
was diagnosed. In light of Thornton, however, it is unlikely that the McKee holding will be
sustained on appeal. See Farrell, Civil Practice- 1978 Survey of New York Law, 30 SYRAcusE
L. REv. 385, 403-04 (1979).
"' While the Thornton rule presumably allows recovery for reasonably anticipated consequential damages, see Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 300-01,
200 N.E. 824, 827 (1936); note 15 and accompanying text supra, it ignores those cases where
injuries are unforeseeable at the time of ingestion. For example, the accrual-on-the-date-ofexposure doctrine would bar the majority of claims for damages caused by radiation exposure,
since injury in such cases typically becomes apparent long after the initial exposure. See
Estep & Van Dyke, RadiationInjuries: Statute of Limitations Inadequacies in Tort Cases,
62 MicH. L. REv. 753, 758-61 (1964).
1 CPLR 205(a) provides:
(a) New action by plaintiff. If an action is timely commenced and is terminated
in any other manner than by a voluntary discontinuance, a dismissal of the complaint for neglect to prosecute the action, or a final judgment upon the merits, the
plaintiff, or if he dies, and the cause of action survives, his executor or administrator, may commence a new action upon the same transaction or occurrence or series
of transactions or occurrences within six months after the termination provided that
the new action would have been timely commenced at the time of commencement
of the prior action.
CPLR 205(a) (Supp. 1979-1980).

